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We propose to use a Random High-Rate Binary (RHRB) stream for the
purpose of key distribution. The idea is as follows. Assume availability of a high-
rate (terabits per second) broadcaster sending random content. Members of the
key group (e.g. fAlice, Bobg) share a weak secret (at least 60 bits) and use it
to make a selection of bits from the RHRB stream at an extremely low rate (1
bit out of 10
16
to 10
18
). By the time that a strong key of reasonable size has
been collected (1,000 bits), an enormous amount of data has been broadcast
(10
19
{10
21
bits). This is 10
6
to 10
8
times current hard drive capacity, which
makes it infeasible for the interceptor (Eve) to store the stream for subsequent
cryptanalysis, which is what the interceptor would have to do in the absence
of the shared secret. Alternatively Eve could record the selection of bits that
correspond to every value of the weak shared secret, which under the above
assumptions requires the same or greater amount of storage i.e. 2
60
 10
3
. The
members of the key group have no need to capture the whole stream, but store
only the tiny part of it that is the key. Eectively this allows a pseudo-random
sequence generated from a weak key to be leveraged up into a strong genuinely
random key.
The stream observation time given a 10Tbit/sec broadcast rate is only 10
6
to
10
8
seconds, or a week to a few months. Over this time the shared secret is not
used for any kind of communication and so the only possible threat is insuÆcient
key storage security, which is present in any cryptographic scheme. It is interest-
ing that in our approach the passage of time strengthens the resulting key: the
longer we wait before the key is used, the less chance there is that any relevant
part of the stream is present in a storage facility anywhere in the world, due to
the sheer mass of data. This is, in a way, opposite to the standard assumption
of cryptographic strength, that keys becomes weaker with time. Accordingly, we
call this system Vintage Bit Cryptography.
It is interesting to note that vintage bits are not a hostage to future tech-
nology development: the ability to record more data per unit cost in future
has no inuence over the present time: vintage bits not recorded now will not
become available later. Nor does leaking the weak secret compromise vintage
bits obtained earlier, provided the time dierence is suÆcient to overwhelm the
capacity of attacker's stream storage. In particular, schemes such as EKE [2,
4] can be used to leverage the initial weak secret into a strong pseudo-random
seed without fear that subsequent development of quantum computers (allowing
the easy solution of discrete logarithm puzzles) will expose previously obtained
vintage bit keys.
Beacon systems have been proposed before [9, 12, 10], particularly in con-
nection with satellites [13]. A traditional beacon implementation based upon a
geostationary satellite would make the key distribution system available over a
wide area at a very small cost to a consumer. But at present digital broadcast
satellites lag far behind optical bre in terms of bandwidth, transmitting only on
the order of 10Gbits/sec, although this rate will increase with the use of higher
microwave bands.
A satellite solution which could prove more interesting is a swarm of micro-
satellites in a Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO). Such satellites could be equipped with
an array of tuned silicon lasers that transmit on a number of wavelengths, and
with physical random bit generators that control the lasers. Importantly, no
radiation protection is required in this case. Indeed, the spacecraft need not
have any processing power since all it broadcasts is random digital noise. LEO
satellites could be tiny: less than a cubic decimeter undeployed size, with a small
production and deployment cost: space scree (rather than dust).
Anyone with a few tens of thousands of dollars to spare can already have
micro-satellites launched using a non-governmental space operator. These satel-
lites can keep orbit for years without thrusters and can maintain their orientation
by purely passive means. The overhead passage for one of these craft would last
20-30 min, so a continuous RHRB stream at terabit rates would require a hun-
dred spacecraft or so. Using a polar orbit one can ensure that the continuous
stream is available anywhere on the planet, and that the area of consistent ob-
servation (where all ground observers can see the same satellites at the same
time), is of the order of 1000km across, which makes it quite suitable for Euro-
pean applications in particular. The XORing of streams produced from several
satellites launched by mutually distrusting parties eliminates the need to trust
any individual craft.
However optical bres are an attractive alternative to satellites, and our
primary interest in this paper is with very high bandwidth bre-optic beacon
systems. The rst implementation issue to consider is feasibility.
A single optical bre can already carry more than 1Tbit/sec with a bit-error
rate (BER) better than 10
 3
using an appropriate combination of Wavelength
Division Multiplexing and Optical Time Division Multiplexing. Low BER is a key
goal of conventional bre optic communications, but this very tough restriction
is not an issue for us. Transmission errors are easily mitigated against by using
a simple protocol based on FEC and cryptographic hash functions:
A  ! B : P jQ
where K = K
1
jK
2
jK
3
are the vintage bits recorded by A: K
1
is the eventual
shared secret with B, K
2
and K
3
are used as one-time pads;
h is a strong hash function, P = K
2
 h(K
1
);
and F is a forward error correction function, Q = K
3
 F (K
1
jK
2
).
The protocol succeeds if B's calculated value for h(K
1
) based on the value
of K
1
jK
2
recovered from Q agrees exactly with the value for h(K
1
) recovered
from P . Note that the message P jQ can be sent over any open, moderately non-
lossy channel: no endpoint authentication is required, and data integrity is an
issue only if we are concerned with denial of service attacks. In particular, if the
message is broadcast, the identity of Bob need not be revealed.
Because low BER is not a consideration for vintage bit cryptography, we are
able to propose the use of cheap optical bre technology which is not suited to
the mainstream communication industry. This provides an attractive (cheap!)
alternative to the optical bre systems already being used for key distribution in
industry, which use very low bit rates and quantum technology. These quantum-
based systems make eavesdropping detectable, but come at a very high cost
[6{8, 14{16]. This form of quantum technology also depends crucially on the
physical integrity of the optical cable: it eliminates passive eavesdropping but
avoiding the man-in-the-middle attack requires at least a weak form of end-to-
end authentication for the side-channel, which imposes constraints similar to the
initial sharing of a weak secret in our proposal.
Ensuring the integrity of the communication path from a shared beacon is
problematic with bre-optic technology (in contrast with satellites). One simple
possibility in the case of a point-to-point link is to co-locate the beacon with one
of the participants (say Alice), as may be done in the quantum key agreement
scenario. However a more interesting case is where we wish a single beacon on a
bre optic loop to be shared by all the loop nodes. In this case we would like to
reduce the integrity requirement to reliance merely the integrity of the beacon
itself, and not that of the bre optic medium.
One possibility in this case is for clients to pre-share a weak secret with the
beacon (or more accurately with a co-located trusted server). As they collect
vintage bits to share with each other, Alice or Bob uses this weak secret to
generate bits shared with the beacon service, over the same observation period
and using the same protocol. The protocol between Alice and Bob now succeeds
only if the vintage bits shared with the beacon have not been tampered with:
if they are correct then the real beacon is the source of the bits shared between
Alice and Bob. Otherwise the bits are corked and should not be used. The
bits shared with the beacon can be discarded, or used to update the weak secret
shared with the beacon. Optionally, the beacon service, since it is trusted anyway,
can be used to share an initial secret between Alice and Bob in case they have
not already been introduced.
However it may be a disadvantage for a beacon protocol to require per-client
state to be kept at the server end, and individual communication between each
node and the server along the side channel. An alternative is to use a variation
of a Merkle-type protocol [3], combined with an additional lower-bandwidth
authenticated broadcast by the server. In this case, whenever Alice and Bob
collect vintage bits, at least one of them also takes a larger random sample of
the beacon, at a rate of order 1 in 10
8
{10
9
. The beacon server also certies (for
example by public key signature or hash pre-image [1, 11]) a random sample of
the broadcast taken at a similar rate, which it publishes following suÆcient delay
to guard against the possibility of a replay attack. The beacon can sample blocks
randomly, rather than individual bits. Alice or Bob can now guard against a false
beacon by verifying (say, more than 80% match) suÆciently many of the bits
which by chance occur in both server and client samples over the course of the
collection period.
The number of shared bits increases linearly with the size of the sample
being collected. Sampling at a rate of 1 in 10
8
for a base transmission rate of
10Tbps will thus require the beacon to certify about 1Gbyte per day. (If Alice
also samples at the rate of 1 in 10
8
then over 80 Merkle bits will be shared per
day.) There would be no technical diÆculty for the beacon to send this amount
of data down the optical medium given the terabit rate of the system. The
beacon sample should be broadcast along with a suÆciently long hash, which
is signed for authentication. However there is no real-time restriction on the
broadcast of the signed hash, which may take place oine. The clients need
to know that the beacon was authentic only before they commit to using the
newly collected shared key, which as we indicated above takes a few weeks to
a few months. This time scale also makes it feasible to employ authentication
based on physical security (e.g. the delivery of physically authenticated records
on tamper-evident media to the clients' sites) as an alternative.
The trust assumptions in our bre-optic approach are very limited, and are
nearly the same as those of the competing quantum approach: the beacon has to
be trusted to be authentically random, and a man-in-the middle attack must be
detected by end-to-end use of a weak secret. However we make no assumptions
about the physical integrity of the bre-optic link.
While the idea of cryptographic use of a beacon is not in itself new, previous
work has tended to focus upon satellite implementations. The threat model for
the bre optic context introduced here is rather dierent to that for the satellite,
and the ramications of this should lead to interesting new developments.
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(Transcript of Discussion)
Alex Shafarenko
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This may be a highly controversial talk, because this is an area where things
are periodically rediscovered. But in the process of reinventing it, I think we've
found a few interesting protocol issues, and a few interesting technological issues,
which make it worth revisiting.
What's the idea of vintage bit cryptography? It's not an established term,
it has other names, but the key idea is that a quantity of information too large
to be stored anywhere on this planet is eectively an unusable secret. What's a
secret? A secret is something that nobody has a copy of, or no bad guy has a
copy of, right. Certainly nobody has a copy of this secret because it's too large to
be copied, and it's unusable for the same reason. So the key principle is: public
transmission of the unusable secret, with subsequent private selection of a small
usable sub-secret. So secrecy comes from two things, the fact that you can't store
the whole thing, and that you don't know which random selection of it has been
taken.
James Heather: How can you transmit the thing if it's too big even to store
it?
Reply: By generating it randomly. It's too big to store, but it's not too big to
transmit over a signicantly long period of time. The amount of information too
large to be stored is technology dependent; this whole approach is technologically
dependent. In a sci- world, if you have 10
20
bits of storage on a PC, this
approach doesn't work, at least at the transmission speeds that we have available
at the moment. But the interesting thing is that the paper by Mitchell
1
goes
back to 1995, and he gives some gures about the cost of storage, transmission
rates, etc, and the gures that we have today still support the principle. Ten
years in this area is a huge amount of time.
So here are some assumptions. I think the assumptions of this method are
more important even than the method, because there are several variations. The
rst assumption is the availability of an open authenticated channel between all
members of the key group. We're talking about key distribution: this protocol
is used for agreeing a secret key within a group of people. So they need to have
an authenticated channel, which doesn't have to be secret, condential, it could
be an open channel. The second assumption is that the public broadcaster has
high entropy, so is genuinely random. If it doesn't have high entropy then it can
be compromised easily by knowing the information basis of the broadcast from
which the whole broadcast can be reconstructed. If you can compromise the
authenticated channel, then the original approach collapses, so in that approach
1
Referenced in the position paper.
you need to secure the authenticated channel very well. (We'll show later how
to remove that assumption.)
So how is it done? The original method was to publicly agree a long observa-
tion period, then Alice and Bob collect a random selection of m bits each, and
they don't tell anybody which bits these are as they collect them. Then they use
the open authenticated channel to check which bits are common between them.
Now if you do the sums then you will see that quite a lot of bits that they collect
are common between them; if they collect m bits each out of the M that are
broadcast then the number of bits that they have in common is about m
2
=M .
These bits form the secret key. They openly tell each other which positions they
have in common because the large unusable secret is already gone, it can't be
stored, and if you didn't know which bits to collect you wouldn't have collected
them.
If there's an interceptor, Eve, then she also has her own random selection,
say of n bits. These bits would have bits in common with both Alice and Bob,
but the proportion of those would be small, assuming that M is such a huge
number that you can't collect that many bits, so n would be much smaller than
M . So Eve doesn't get very much; for practical purposes Eve gets nothing at
all with a high probability. This is wonderful because no secret communication
between Alice and Bob takes place, and yet they've agreed a common secret key,
and nobody can intercept that, and the only thing that we need to secure is an
open authenticated channel.
The rst thing that comes to mind is that this is not a very scalable procedure
because if you have lots of pairs of users exploiting the same public broadcast |
and the public broadcast is an expensive thing, so you would want to share that
| then what's the probability that an arbitrary user can intercept the private
key of a pair that he doesn't belong to? We all know about the birthday attack,
so this is not a small number necessarily, and the public source is expensive so
we would like lots of people to share that.
Now with protocol issues, the original paper admits that if the open authen-
ticated channel is there then you can use DiÆe-Hellman and agree a private
key, so what's the point of having a public broadcast? There is a point, still,
because DiÆe-Hellman may in the future be broken (quantum cryptography, all
the rest of it), and the proposed scheme is free of all that, it gives you genuinely
random keys. However, if you do have an open authenticated channel of good
quality, you can assume at least that DiÆe-Hellman will not be broken over the
observation period, which in the original paper is one day. Also it's one day so
you're not short of time; you can spend an hour of that day to run a really
huge DiÆe-Hellman, which is hard to break even if you have some trick up your
sleeve. And the complexity of DiÆe-Hellman is linear in the size of the key. So,
maybe all you need to do is to have a common secret, a small shared secret
between Alice and Bob, and use that for a common random selection, then you
don't need to rely upon the collisions between selected bits, and so that makes it
unnecessary to use any protocol subsequently, you just share a secret, and after
an observation period you have a strong key which is common to Alice and Bob.
Another reason to make this assumption is that an open authenticated chan-
nel (in the absence of the trusted third party, public key infrastructure, and all
the rest of it), does involve sharing some sort of secret, so a shared secret is
already assumed in a way. If you don't want to use public key cryptography,
why not use the shared secret for a common random selection.
But there's a much greater problem. In fact it is, strictly speaking, insupera-
ble in the scheme that's being proposed. It is impossible to prove that the public
broadcast has suÆcient entropy. A bad guy can replace the public source by
a random number generator, note the seed of the random generator, wait for
the shared secret to be used to collect a strong key, and then use the random
generator again to recover the strong key completely. And it is impossible for
the broadcaster to prove that it is genuine, that it doesn't use any random,
pseudo random generator, and it is possible to disprove by the user. So you need
a technological solution. I can't see any kind of cryptographic solution here.
Another problem is the fact that high bit rate sources (and we need one
for public broadcast here), are prone to errors. So Alice and Bob will not have
exactly the same bits from the same random selection; they will have a large key
with a high proportion of bits common, but some not: maybe up to 10% errors,
if we use the technology that I will touch upon later. So you need some sort of
protocol to agree a common key when you have almost coincident bit strings.
Well in fact it's not diÆcult. Here's your bit key K = K1jK2jK3 that you've
collected from vintage bits. The part that you want to be the shared secret key
is K1, then you sacrice K2 and K3. Alice calculates a forward error correction
check-sum F (K1jK2) based on her value of K1jK2. That FEC check-sum would
be such that it could correct a large number of errors | it has enough redun-
dancy. We don't want to disclose any information about the secret key so Alice
XORs the FEC with her value of K3. This may not be the same K3 as for Bob,
because K3 also has errors. But fortunately the forward correcting algorithms
do not require you to have a clean check-sum; a check-sum can also have errors,
and that doesn't prevent their recovery. All you need to be worried about is that
the strength of the error correcting algorithm is suÆcient to recover from errors
in both.
OK, so A  ! B : FEC(K1
a
jK2
a
)K3
a
. If the strength of error correction
is suÆcient then B can compute A's value for K1, and this is the shared key.
Now we need to verify that it's the same key, that the error-correction has
worked. We can do this at the same time as removing the requirement for an
authenticated channel by including a strong cryptographic check-sum, so A  !
B : h(K1
a
)K2
a
. If the rst step worked then Bob has the same value as Alice
for K2, so he can recover Alice's value for h(K1) and compare this with the hash
of his own value for K1 which doesn't have to be the same for Alice and Bob. So
at the end of this the protocol either fails, because there were too many errors,
or it succeeds. Now the technology that we'll talk about a bit later is reliable
enough that you can almost guarantee that it always succeeds.
OK, so what's the technology? I collaborate with one of the leading bre-optic
groups in the world, I think. At Aston University they've got a huge experimental
set-up worth millions, and they also do lots of theoretical research, and so I
called them up three days ago and said that I needed something fast, and not
necessarily reliable. They said, well that's a problem, we can give you 5 terabytes
per second, but no better than 10
 3
bit error rate. I said, I'm happy with 10
 1
bit error rate. They said, well that may be 10 terabytes per second, but we won't
go further than across the Atlantic. I said, I don't mean across the Atlantic, I
mean locally, between the main headquarters of the bank, and the branch, maybe
200 kilometres. They said, well we haven't researched that, maybe 100 terabytes
per second. They just split the optical range in the bre in 2000 channels, and
they send 5 gigabytes per second down each channel, and they're very worried
about interference between dierent channels. If I want a random stream then I
needn't be worried about that, because it can't get less random due to that.
Audience: I just want to query the idea that it can't get less random. If you
have the sort of interference where one channel is completely wiping out another
channel, then that would make it less random.
Reply: Ah, that's not what happens. What happens is that the bit error
rate, which is normally 10
 6
, becomes 10
 2
. It's a non-linear medium, highly
unpredictable, and there's also noise from ampliers, from repeaters, from all
sorts of things; there's a huge amount of technology sitting behind it.
So that's very interesting for them, nobody asked them before for a bad bre
which is fast, people usually ask them for a good bre, and don't mind it being
a bit slow.
The other problem that they nd with optical bres is that they're bursty,
errors come in clusters. We absolutely don't care about that either, because we
make a very rareed selection, we take one bit out of 10
17
.
So what's feasible storage? People from the Grid project can correct me, but
last time I checked. . . there's this European collider project which requires the
computational grid to store collision data from a year's worth of observation,
and they reckon to need 10 Petabytes, and that's huge. OK, let's assume 100
Petabytes is unfeasible, just for the sake of the argument. Then the question is,
how weak is the weak secret? If the weak secret is very weak, then I can just
do the observation for each value of the secret, instead of observing the whole
stream. Basically if you have N bits in the broadcast, and you need k bits of key,
then assuming that you have a good random generator, you need log
2
N   log
2
k
bits of weak secret. Even under aggressive assumptions 60 bits would secure
vintage-bit cryptography. What's 60 bits | a 10 character password. They can
share a 10 character password, then after the observation period they can publish
that password, right, because you can't go back in time and collect those bits
that you needed to have collected.
George Danezis: So how could you actually generate good randomness of
the public broadcast?
Reply: Oh, well, just use a resistor, heat it up, and trigger some digital
device, you will get good randomness; I promise you can't repeat it.
Michael Roe: I know that type of device, and it turns out to be quite hard
to get an acceptable number of random bits out of them because it amplies all
kinds of horrible things and you end up having a sort of driven oscillator.
Ross Anderson: That's a separate engineering problem about which much
is known, but the way I see this as you present it, you're not actually doing
broadcast randomness, you're really competing with the quantum crypto guys,
who say, give us a bre from London to Geneva, and we'll send you a key. That
is what makes this dierent from Maurer.
Reply: Yes, yes, that's exactly right. I have a slide about that at the end,
because there's more than one very interesting technology that ts the vintage
bit sort of scenario.
We need a countermeasure for the low entropy problem. What can we do?
We can use a reector instead of a public source, so each guy in the key group
generates their own randomness at a smaller rate, if you have a thousand users,
then you just generate one thousandth of the public broadcast bandwidth.
Mike Bond: What do you mean by reectors? Are they an abstraction?
Reply: No, it's a physical device. The reector just combines streams from
these sources.
Mike Bond: So it's a mirror?
Reply: No, it's a transponder essentially. It takes information from all these
channels, which are dierent wavelengths on the same bre, for instance, and
then interleaves them. If it doesn't have enough sources it can interleave some
random sources as well, of it's own doing. The more users you have for this
system, the better it works. That's one half of it. The other half is a monitoring
loop, each of the users computes mutual information between the bits that were
sent to the reector, and the bits that were received in the same positions.
Suppose there's a random interleave, for instance, using a public formula, so we
know where our bits are. The reector can't guarantee that these bits will be
intact, because there are users that will collide with those bits, or there may be
also some random content that will collide with this, but we can measure the
amount of mutual information, and if it drops below the critical level we can
raise the red ag, after the observation period. The crucial thing here for safety
of the cryptographic solution is that we don't communicate at all during the
observation period, because we want to make full use of the huge shared secret.
OK, now just note that neither the reector, nor the channels to the reector,
are trusted. This doesn't matter; you can intercept everything, you can forge
anything you want. Because of the monitoring of mutual information, you will
be found out eventually. It's statistical of course, it's all probabilistic.
Now quantum key distribution has been mentioned, and Toshiba is selling
a solution; it's no longer in the lab, it's a product. You have a piece of bre,
and a technology that guarantees that a single photon emitted by the source is
received by the receiver without anybody intercepting it. If somebody intercepts
it, this will be detected. The cost of this technology is tens of thousands of euros,
depending on what you buy, per user. It has a reasonably high performance |
it actually transmits about 100 secure bits per second, which for cryptographic
applications is quite a large number. Bruce drew my attention to the fact that it
is actually quite prone to the man-in-the-middle attack, just cut the bre, get the
man-in-the-middle, you're done. That's why they need integrity and end-point
authentication on the side-channel. You could continuously monitor the bre,
using all the other measures that you can take to prevent man-in-the-middle,
but if you can do that then you don't need quantum key agreement in the rst
place. In fact we all know a power failure goes a long way in these schemes!
There's also talk about satellites. Why can't we have a satellite broadcaster
up in the sky and use it as a source of vintage bits? In fact we can't. My rst
instinct was to use a TV broadcast satellite, it's got about a thousand TV
channels, each channel around 2 Megabytes per second, so this is in the order of
10 Gigabytes per second. The problem is that all the contents of the broadcast
is recorded somewhere, and if you need a selection you just go back in time and
ask the content providers to give you a copy. However, there's new and exciting
technology called UWB, you probably have heard about it, because it's going
to be used for PCs, short-range communication, but it is particularly good for
satellites.
We are coming to the period in technological development where the term
\frequency" will fall out of use. Now the content will carry itself, there's no
carrier. What will happen is, you will have pulses of electromagnetic energy,
200 pico seconds in length (that's a very short pulse), with a duty cycle about
64K, so there will be 64K slots, on average, between two pulses. The amount
of energy that accumulates in one pulse is such that if you just consider these
pulses, you could hear them at the end of the solar system. But because you
hear noise in between, you can't hear them. So the same principle applies, the
pulses are positioned according to some sort of random sequence, if you know
that sequence you can hear. By the time you've cracked the password you've
already missed all the bits, so it works on the same principle.
Now if you don't want a geostationary satellite being used as a source for
reasons of entropy (because it could be compromised, an evil government can
control it), then to get free of this problem you can have a swarm of micro-
satellites on Low-Earth-Orbit. You have a satellite orbiting the earth not very
far up, like 100 kilometres, and now the earth will rotate underneath. Now if
you have, say, 40 satellites here, in the same orbit, then what happens is that
you will always have a satellite overhead. The footprint of this scheme is about
three or four hundred kilometres and within that area all the users will see the
same satellites. Now each micro-satellite can be completely dumb, it could be
mass produced, it doesn't even have to have any kind of intelligent electronics,
or radiation protection, because all it needs to do is create digital noise |
not analogue noise because that's hard to deal with, but digital noise. Now to
compromise this scheme, you would have to compromise a signicant number of
satellites because users can XOR several of them. You can have not 40, but 400,
in that orbit. They are the size of a grapefruit and the cost of launch is about
10,000 euros per kilogram, which is competing with the quantum distribution
bre-optic solution from Toshiba. The satellite itself will be free, though, because
it has no intelligent satellite guts in it. It's just a simple electronic circuit, which
actually is faulty as well, because it's not radiation protected; but that's OK, you
can't get more random than random. And I don't think this is compromisable
by any kind of realistic means. In science ction you just y your spaceship to
each of the satellites and replace it, but since NASA tracks all satellites the size
of grapefruit and above, this will be known; if you just touch it, it changes orbit.
OK, conclusions. Over the last ten years, the storage to speed ratio has not
changed much. We can still do vintage bit cryptography, and that encourages
me to suggest that maybe we will be able to do it for the foreseeable future.
Despite the fact that I've shown two schemes, I don't think satellites are a
good solution because of the cost of management implications, and trust issues.
However, I must say that a bre-optic broadcaster is entirely possible, to the
extent that we're going to construct one, with the guys from Aston University,
and demonstrate it.
Bruce Christianson: We think we can undercut the quantum bre optic
product.
Ross Anderson: You don't need a broadcaster, you need a bre-optic link?
Reply: Yes, a broadcaster in bre-optic, so there will be one source and lots
of receivers along the same bre.
Mike Bond: Sorry, did you assert earlier on that your scheme is invulnerable
to man-in-the-middle in the same way as the Toshiba scheme is, or that it isn't?
Reply: I did assert it given that we have a reector on the source. The rst
experiments will be with the source, then we'll try and engineer a reector.
Mike Bond: Using cable cutting between people and the reector, why can't
the attacker assemble everybody into a virtual subnet with 49 other imaginary
people, and 50 reectors? So everybody talks to their own reector, and 49 other
fake people?
Reply: The amount of mutual information that the key group receives from
the reector is known by calculation. We monitor what the reector throws at
us, and any random sample from any other people...
Mike Bond: But each person's monitoring their own?
Bruce Christianson: I understand what you're saying: the channel over
which the protocol runs | you remember the XOR and the forward error-
correcting scheme | that's not over bre-optics, that's end-to-end coverage.
Ross Anderson: You need some authentication somewhere.
Bruce Christianson: Yes, you do, but so do the quantum people. You
need to know that you're listening to the correct source. This typically involves
a conventional side-channel.
Ross Anderson: Which brings us back to the problems of having the au-
thentication end-to-end. We know the quantum crypto guys have dierent ways
of doing this, by looking at hashes of sub-streams they receive and checking
that the hashes are the same; presumably at least one type of bootstrap from
password will do that. You can't do it many times from the same password
though.
Bruce Christianson: The key point is that the quantum people have this
same problem, and there we can use the same techniques that they're using. They
have to have a weak shared secret for authentication. For the next authentication,
we can use some of the new strong secret.
Reply: Actually the communication between Alice and Bob doesn't need to
be authenticated at all, it only needs to be authenticated if you want to deal
with denial of service, for no other reasons.
Bruce Christianson: Yes, that's true.
Michael Roe: Don't you also have to know that the secret that you end up
with is shared with the person you think it's shared with, rather than with the
attacker?
Ross Anderson: The authentication there is implicit, because the authen-
tication is not going to work if you chose dierent sub-streams of the random
source. What you're demonstrating here then is yet another way in which to par-
lay a weak shared secret into strong authentications, namely using your mech-
anism of very long bit streams, and transmitting sub-streams with their error
correction bits.
Bruce Christianson: Unlike the quantum people, we get that for nothing.
Ross Anderson: OK, so you should bring out in the paper that you have
got yet another alternative to EKE.
Bruce Christianson: Yes, that is a good point. I think the other point
worth making is this: the rst step is for users to get from the weak secret to a
strong secret, and then to use the strong secret where they would have otherwise
used the weak one to authenticate. That way they can do it as many times as
they like.
Ross Anderson: Yes, OK. So perhaps what one ought to do is write this
out formally as a paper, and point out that you've got an error correction-based
protocol for authentication.
Bruce Christianson: Yes, that's a good way of putting it actually, because
that makes the novelty clear.
Audience: A second question I had was about your storage requirement
assumptions. When you said 100 petabytes, I remember doing sums for a look-
up table for DES, which was about 500 petabytes for a single ciphertext. I was
thinking, gosh, I wonder if the NSA has got 500 petabytes. My question is,
given the special requirements of keeping the data just long enough to be able to
look back and get the bits you want just in time, could there be any specialised
storage, for instance, like the equivalent of mercury delay lines set at solar system
scale, or could you send it all into space?
Bruce Christianson: Or use slow glass
2
.
2
Bob Shaw, Light of Other Days, Analog, August 1966. In the story the refractive
index of slow glass is about 1:5  10
19
, as light takes 10 years to travel a quarter
of an inch. Lene Vestergaard Hau et al, Nature 397(1999) p 594 describe real slow
glass with an RI of 310
10
, about 120 feet per hour. However for real slow glass the
product of delay with bandwith is xed for a given cross section, so it is still worth
investing in a picture window, rather than a single thin bre.
Mike Bond: Just keep it spinning in optic-bres for long enough.
Bruce Christianson: Or bounce it o a deep space probe, and send it back
again.
Reply: The observation period is not necessarily limited to one day; the
longer it is, the more insuperable the acquisition problem becomes.
Mike Bond: What's the regional range for satellites at the moment, pre-
sumably only a few light hours?
Bruce Christianson: There's some probes that have already left the solar
system. And maybe aliens will reect our broadcasts back at us
3
.
Reply: You won't get my signal back. This is my rst attendance at a secu-
rity protocols workshop, and Bruce warned me to expect intellectual paranoia.
But this is paranoia on a galactic scale. You need a 70 metre deep-space network
dish to communicate with something that's that far.
Bruce Christianson: The key point is that you need to have already
launched the probe some time ago.
Reply: Yes, the whole strength of this approach is that it is retrospective,
all of it, yes.
Bruce Christianson: The advantage of this approach is that magic buttons
invented tomorrow don't help the attacker against bits you have already laid
down.
Reply: Exactly, you need a time-machine to break this; we could call it
time-machine security.
Jolyon Clulow: I'm still not clear what the dierence is between this and
Michael Rabin's proposals for a eet of satellites.
Bruce Christianson: Well, we didn't say much about the bre-optic case
in the talk
4
, the short answer is that the threat model is dierent for bre optic.
But in all cases the trick that makes it work is that you can't store all the
potential key material at once.
Ross Anderson: So what precisely are the security semantics of strings that
are too long to store? We've seen now several examples of things that we can
do with them. Suppose you have got an Oracle, which is privileged over normal
mortals in that it has innite memory, what special tricks can we make this
Oracle do, what sort of new complexity tasks can you conjure up to keep the
theoreticians busy for the next 30 years?
Reply: What a wonderful thought, that's a good question to end on.
3
Probably starting with the BBC Third Programme.
4
Largely because we hadn't yet led the patent application.
